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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to transcend current debates on Korea’s post-1997 restructuring, which rely 
on a dichotomy between domestic industrial capital and foreign financial capital, by adopting 
Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power perspective. Based on this approach, the paper analyzes 
Korea’s recent political economic restructuring as the latest phase in the evolution of capitalist 
power and its transformative regimes of capital accumulation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
More than 15 years have passed since Korean society underwent a radical neoliberal reform in 
the immediate wake of the 1997 financial crisis. The so-called Washington consensus of liber-
alization, deregulation, privatization, and labor flexibilization, which in Korea was originally 
intended to be implemented in a gradual and controlled way, turned into a radical reform un-
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der the IMF’s supervision.1 In 1998, a year after the Korean government had officially asked 
the IMF for a bailout, Korea’s exchange rate was floated; restrictions on the foreign ownership 
of Korean stocks and bonds were abolished; and the foreign takeover of Korean firms was 
fully deregulated. In addition to these financial changes, flexible labor has become the norm. 
Consequently, Korea’s economy has become increasingly exposed to the vagaries of the glob-
al market, while job insecurity has become widespread.  
There is a widespread consensus among Korean critical economists that a qualitative-
ly different society has emerged from the 1997 crisis. Yet debates on the nature of the restruc-
turing and the cause of the crisis remain heated. Leading opinion makers commonly character-
ize the social change as defined by “polarized growth,” a consequence of Korea’s transition 
from a “high-economic growth model with high investment” to a “low-economic growth 
model with low investment” (Ryu and Ahn 2010). Although the Korean economy recovered 
rapidly from the crisis, the benefits of the recovery did not “trickle down.” Except for a few 
members of the upper class, most social groups have suffered economic hardship as the engine 
of Korea’s long-term growth has weakened, flexible labor has made the job market extremely 
unstable, and the gap between “big” and “small” businesses has widened (Jung 2006).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Corporate Profit and Economic Growth 
 
Note: All series are expressed as three-year moving averages.  
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
                                                 
1 The beginnings of Korea’s neoliberal reforms can be traced back to the early 1980s, when its commer-
cial banks, previously under state control, were completely privatized. This was also the period when 
Korea-U.S. bilateral negotiations for trade liberalization began. 
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Figure 1 offers a snapshot of the Korean political economy before and after the 1997 
crisis. The chart shows two series: real GDP growth and the share of corporate profit in na-
tional income, both expressed as three-year moving averages. The data reveal two important 
patterns: (1) that growth had already been trending downward by the mid-1980s; and (2) that 
after 1997, the rate of growth and the profit share have decoupled. During the pre-1997 peri-
od, the profit share of national income was positively and tightly correlated with the growth of 
GDP. By contrast, after 1997, growth continued to decelerate while the profit share of income 
soared to record highs. In post-1997 Korea, capitalists prospered as the economy lingered.  
While most observers agree that growth has become polarized, they disagree heatedly 
on the underlying causes and their relationship with the 1997 crisis. Views on the subject can 
be grouped into two opposing camps. One camp finds the cause in cronyism and the anachro-
nistic management of the chaebols, Korea’s leading business groups (S. Kim et al. 2007; S. 
Kim 2004; G. Kim 2001; Jang 1998). The other camp blames the process on the “unproduc-
tive” and “speculative” nature of foreign financial capital (Chang 2007, 2004; Chang and Sin 
2004). Accordingly, the former camp, expecting an improvement in corporate transparency 
and economic efficiency, welcomes the “retreat of the state” and the advent of market-centred 
economic reforms. The latter camp, reminiscing about the rapid economic growth under the 
military dictatorship, campaigns for the restoration of the statist development model in which 
the economy is led by the state-chaebol nexus. 
This paper argues that, despite their popularity, both camps use inadequate frame-
works and fail to grasp the nature of Korea’s recent social transformation. First, it is mislead-
ing to assume that the state stands against the market and that domestic industrial capital is 
productive while foreign financial capital is unproductive, or vice versa. These dichotomous 
assumptions lead both camps to ignore the intertwined transformation and integration of capi-
tal, the state, and the market, as well as the capitalization of power on a global scale that un-
derlies these processes (as elaborated below). Second, the two camps offer little or no empiri-
cal evidence to show that the interests of “market-oriented” foreign capital in fact conflict with 
those of the “state-centered” Korean chaebols. The net result of these theoretical and empirical 
inadequacies is that most “progressive” critiques of foreign capital or the chaebols end up 
offering “conservative” solutions. 
Historically, Korean capitalist power has evolved under state protection; at the same 
time, the development of this power has changed the very nature of the Korean state. On the 
one hand, the power of the state to affect capitalist earnings and risk has been “capitalized” 
into stock and bond values, and in that sense this power has become a facet of capital. On the 
other hand, state organizations and institutions have been increasingly conditioned and shaped 
by the logic of capital. Since earnings and risk perception are affected by the increasingly in-
tertwined power of state and capital (whether “industrial” or “financial”), and given that this 
intertwined power is discounted into present asset prices, we can say that state and capital 
have become “part and parcel of the same architecture of mechanized social power” (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2009: 281). From this perspective, it is misleading to distinguish industrial capital 
from financial capital. The reason is partly because conglomeration has made the task practi-
cally impossible, but mostly because both types of capital pursue one and the same goal: to 
accumulate capital as power denominated in financial terms. 
One of the major premises of this article is that, in order to grasp the nature of Ko-
rea’s post-1997 restructuring, we need to focus on the transformation of the country’s 
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chaebols and their changing patterns of accumulation. To highlight the historical importance 
of this process, consider the aggregate concentration of net profit shown in Figure 2. The chart 
shows three indices. The denominator in all three is the aggregate net profit of all Korean cor-
porations as estimated by the national income accounts. The numerator for the first index is 
the total net profit of the 30 largest chaebols; for the second index, the numerator is the net 
profit of the top four chaebols; and for the third index, it is the net profit of Samsung. Over the 
ten years between 1987 and 1996, the average aggregate concentration was 14.7 percent for 
the top 30 chaebols, 10.7 for the top 4, and 4.4 for Samsung. In 2001-2010, these average 
shares were more than three times higher: 55 percent for the top 30, 34.2 for the top 4, and 
17.1 for Samsung. This rapid increase in aggregate concentration suggests that the post-1997 
rise in the capital share of national income shown in Figure 1 was led by Korea’s core busi-
ness group. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The Aggregate Concentration of Corporate Profits 
 
*The ratio of the net profit of the chaebols to corporate profit in the national income accounts. 
 
Note: All series are expressed as three-year moving averages. Periods during which either the chaebol 
groups’ or overall corporate profits were negative are omitted.  
 
Sources: Bank of Korea; Fair Trade Commission; Samsung (1998) and Samsung Online. 
 
 
The purpose of this article is to go beyond current debates on the post-1997 restruc-
turing of Korean society in two related ways: (1) by providing new empirical insight into the 
transformation of the Korean political economy in general and capital accumulation in par-
ticular; and (2) by using a new analytical framework to articulate and make sense of these 
processes. 
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This framework is that of capital as power, an alternative political economic ap-
proach elaborated by Nitzan and Bichler (2009, 2002). Their analysis of capital accumulation 
can be characterized by the following two key features, which distinguish it from both Marxist 
and neoclassical approaches. First, Nitzan and Bichler argue that the main driver of capitalism 
is not absolute wealth but relative power. Modern capitalists are compelled not to “maximize 
profit,” but to “beat the average” and exceed the normal rate of return. Their key goal is to 
accumulate not “real” commodities measured in utils or labor time, but relative claims on 
nominal income streams and discounted assets. In their quest for power, they seek not maxi-
mum accumulation, but differential accumulation.2  
Second, the focus on differential-accumulation-read-power rather than the growth of 
“real assets” shifts the focus of analysis. Instead of seeking economic growth through produc-
tive activities, capitalists are forced to engage in what Veblen called strategic sabotage: a de-
liberate attempt to limit the productive capacity of society at large and to exclude others capi-
talists from business opportunities (a process that will be explained in the next section). Thus, 
whereas from the conventional viewpoint, both liberal and Marxist, economic slowdown and 
unemployment are detrimental to accumulation, from the perspective of capital as power they 
are often essential for its success.      
Based on Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power approach, the research here demon-
strates, first, that Korea’s low, “polarized” growth is not detrimental to, but rather essential for, 
its new regime of accumulation. In an attempt to overcome the limits of the previous regime 
of rapid industrial expansion, the country’s chaebols intensified their strategic sabotage 
against other social groups. This intensification enabled them to emerge quickly from the 
1997 crisis by constructing a new regime that uses low growth to achieve a massive upward 
redistribution of income, assets, and power.  
Second, the article shows that the process of globalization, which has contributed 
significantly to Korea’s drastic social transformation, has been driven primarily by the trans-
nationalization of capitalist power through the spatial integration of ownership and accumula-
tion. Korea’s ruling capitalists, having transcended their parochial boundaries, have integrated 
into the transnational structure of global absentee owners. As a result, it makes little sense to 
posit that the interests of “Korean industrial capital” are pitted against those of “foreign finan-
cial capital.” As chaebol ownership grows increasingly transnational, the interests of “local” 
and “foreign” owners become inseparably fused and the alleged difference between their “in-
dustrial” and “financial” character dissipates. 
 
 
2. Understanding Polarized Growth from a Power Perspective 
 
Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power framework offers theoretical vantage points for the sys-
tematic understanding of the phenomenon of polarized growth, characterized by accumulation 
amidst low investment and low growth. This phenomenon may appear abnormal when viewed 
through the lens of conventional economics, which defines capital as a productive entity and 
                                                 
2 In practice, capitalists can never know whether they have maximized their profits and assets; but they 
can usually know whether they have beaten the average. For example, whether a rate of return of 10 
percent is high or low depends on the average rate of return. If the average is 5 percent, it is high; if the 
average is 15 percent, it is low. 
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analyzes economic development primarily in aggregate terms. Although emphasizing the class 
nature of economic growth, most Marxist approaches also tend to assume a positive relation-
ship between economic growth and capital accumulation. From a Marxist viewpoint, capital 
accumulation through the never-ending cycle of MC P CM (or M+M) is associat-
ed with more investment in fixed capital; and from this viewpoint, Korea’s transition from a 
“high-economic growth model with high investment” to a “low-economic growth model with 
low investment” must be viewed as detrimental to capitalist accumulation. Writing in this vein, 
prominent Korean Marxist Sengjin Jeong (2005: 18) argues that the Korean economy is not 
out of the woods yet. Until it embarks on a new economic boom, with high levels of employ-
ment, investment, and profitability similar to those of the mid-1980s, any talk of a new regime 
of capital accumulation is premature.   
Seen from the perspective of capital as power, though, polarized growth is not a hin-
drance to accumulation but, on the contrary, an integral part of it. Capitalists, as Thorstein 
Veblen (1923) said, do “business” by privatizing “industry.” In Veblen’s terminology, the 
distinction between industry and business is based on a parallel separation between workman-
ship and the predatory instinct. Industry, denoting the integrated, holistic processes of produc-
tion and reproduction, is derived from the historically accumulated creativity of the communi-
ty as a whole. By contrast, business is an exclusive claim on—or the privatization of—this 
productive communal effort. In this sense, profit-seeking capitalists are reminiscent of rent-
seeking absentee landlords, which is why Veblen defined modern capitalists as absentee own-
ers. In this conceptual framework, capital income represents not productive activities as such 
but power over the social process of industry. This power in turn is based on organized exclu-
sion and deprivation. This latter aspect of capitalism was also emphasized by Karl Marx 
(1887: 454), who explained the enclosure movement as the “usurpation of common lands” by 
landlords. From the viewpoint of capital as power, though, “enclosure” is not confined to the 
era of primitive accumulation, but is embedded in the legal concept of private ownership as 
such. With private ownership, capitalists are entitled to deprive the underlying population of 
the right to work and to build barriers that prevent other capitalists from entering their busi-
ness territories. Veblen (1921: 38) referred to these actions as “strategic sabotage” and held 
that “the conscious withdrawal of efficiency”—the deliberate limitation of production below 
its full potential—was a necessary condition for capitalists to maintain high earnings. 
From the viewpoint of capital as power, the capitalist income share does not neces-
sarily have a positive relationship with production. Up to a point, this share is likely to move 
together with the utilization of industrial capacity. Beyond that point, though, the relationship 
between the two becomes negative. This non-linear relationship is succinctly illustrated in 
Figure 3. The reason behind this changing relationship is not difficult to figure out. “If indus-
try always and everywhere operated at full socio-technological capacity (bottom right point),” 
argue Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 236-7), “industrial considerations rather than business deci-
sions would be paramount, production would no longer need the consent of owners, and these 
owners would then be unable to extract their tributary earnings.” 
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Figure 3 Business and Industry 
 
Source: Nitzan and Bichler (2009) Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder, p. 237.  
 
 
For instance, without intellectual-property rights, which are enforced by states and 
free-trade-related international organizations, the earnings and capitalization of global con-
glomerates such as Microsoft, Pfizer, and EMI would plummet dramatically because cheap or 
“free” counterfeits of similar quality would occupy the markets. To boost their differential 
profits, capitalists try to strategically restrict the industrial activities of their existing or poten-
tial rivals. Quite often, they also restrict their own output, sometimes in alliance with others, in 
order to maintain higher profit margins that more than compensate for the lost volume. The 
aggregate consequence of these efforts is a lingering economic slack and under-capacity utili-
zation, which mainstream economists often refer to as the natural rate of unemployment.3 
From this viewpoint, the decelerating economic growth after the 1997 crisis, along with slow-
ing green-field investment, worsening job security, and a widening gap between “big” and 
“small” businesses, can be understood as a result of the chaebols’ intensification of their stra-
tegic sabotage to augment their differential earnings. The success of their strategy is evident 
from the massive concentration of corporate profit in the hands of the 30 largest chaebols 
(Figure 2), which, in turn, led to an unprecedented rise in the share of corporate profit in na-
                                                 
3 Writing in a similar vein, Baran and Sweezy (1966: 108) held that “the normal state of the monopoly 
capitalist economy is stagnation… chronic underutilization of available human and material resources.” 
But for them, this stagnation represents the inevitable crisis of monopoly capitalism, whereas from the 
viewpoint of capital as power, it is a necessary basis for differential accumulation (see Bichler and 
Nitzan 2014).  
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tional income (Figure 1). In order to understand the structural underpinnings of this process, 
we need to delve a little further into Nitzan and Bichler’s analytical framework. 
 
 
3. Strategic Sabotage and Differential Accumulation 
 
Elaborating on Veblen’s concept of strategic sabotage, Nitzan and Bichler put forward a sys-
tematic framework to analyze capital accumulation that is very different from the ones offered 
by both neoclassicists and Marxists. From their viewpoint, capital is power, and therefore the 
value of a commodity, the profit of a firm, and the accumulation of capital represent neither 
the productivity of factor inputs (i.e. utils) nor socially necessary abstract labor time, but the 
power of capitalists over the entire societal process of production and reproduction. This pow-
er is based not only on business arrangements in a narrow sense, but on the whole spectrum of 
institutional arrangements that systematically impact capitalist abilities to subjugate the under-
lying population and prevent other capitalists from having access to the same profit flows. 
Historically, dominant capitalists have developed various means of imposing this strategic 
sabotage, thereby creating and sustaining their superior performance over competitors. Nitzan 
and Bichler (2009: 247) argue that 
 
These means include direct limitations, such as predatory pricing, formal and infor-
mal collusion, advertising and exclusive contracts. They also include broader strate-
gies like targeted education, patent and copyright laws, industrial policies, financial 
regulations, preferential tax treatment, legal monopolies, labour legislation, trade and 
investment pacts and barriers and, of course, the use of force, including military, for 
differential business ends. 
 
In contemporary capitalism, virtually all government policies and legal arrangements 
have a differential impact on business performance, an effect that favors some groups of com-
panies over others. Thus, nowadays, strategic sabotage needs to be understood in this broad 
sense, in which the state plays an integral role in capitalists’ politics of exclusion and depriva-
tion. Furthermore, capitalist struggles to strategically shape institutional arrangements in their 
own interest prompt “the relentless formation and reformation of ‘distributional coalitions.’” 
Eventually, this process culminates in the emergence of dominant capital, which Nitzan and 
Bichler (2009: 315) define as “a cluster that we equate with the leading corporate-government 
coalitions at the core of the [social] process.” Dominant capital is the victor—at least tempo-
rarily—in the war of mutual strategic sabotage to secure higher-than-average profit and differ-
ential accumulation. The upshot of this understanding is that the quantitative analysis of capi-
tal accumulation should focus also, and perhaps more so, on the disaggregate level. In practice, 
differences in the growth rate of corporate profits and assets between dominant capital and the 
rest of the business universe are the rule rather than the exception; furthermore, outperfor-
mance is the driving force in contemporary capitalism. It is for this reason that Nitzan and 
Bichler’s capital-as-power approach makes “beating-the-average” a key tool in analyzing ac-
cumulation.  
Although most Marxist approaches emphasize the “concentration and centralization 
of capital,” there has been little effort to elaborate a systematic framework to quantitatively 
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analyze accumulation at a disaggregate level. The inhibition here is at least partly related to 
the labor theory of value, the cornerstone of Marxist political economy. The problem is that 
the labor theory of value is premised on perfect competition and the free flow of capital and 
labor, and therefore on an “equilibrium profit rate and equilibrium prices of production” 
(Howard and King 1992: 278).  
One exception is the monopoly capital school, which emphasizes the role of capitalist 
and state power, and therefore abandons labor values in favor of prices and surplus value in 
favor of surplus.4 However, although it deals with aspects of power, the theory of monopoly 
capital remains pitched at the aggregate level (see Foster and McCheney 2012). Furthermore, 
the theory has not incorporated power into its concept of capital, which is still conceived as a 
“real,” backward-looking economic quantity rather than a differential, forward-looking power 
entity (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 261-262). Sweezy (1991), recognizing the limits of the “capi-
tal-as-real capital goods” approach, said that “a better understanding of the monopoly capital-
ist society of today will be possible only on the basis of a more adequate theory of capital ac-
cumulation, with special emphasis on the interaction of its real and financial aspects, than we 
now possess.”  
By contrast, Nitzan and Bichler focus on capitalization, which denotes the present 
value of expected future earnings, and which in their view is “the universal creed of capital-
ism” (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 8). Based on this view, they suggest the following analytical 
formulation of capital accumulation.  
 
1. From a static perspective, the differential power possessed by a particular group of 
owners should be measured by its differential capitalization (DK), that is by compar-
ing the group’s combined capitalization to that of the average capital unit. If this av-
erage is $5 million, a capital worth $5 billion represents a DK of 1,000. This magni-
tude means that, as a group, the owners of that capital are 1,000 times more powerful 
than the owners of an average capital. 
2. From a dynamic viewpoint, the change in differential power is measured by the rate 
of differential accumulation (DA), defined as the rate of change of DK. To achieve 
differential accumulation, owners need to have their own capitalization grow faster 
than the average capitalization. Positive, zero, or negative rates of DA imply rising, 
unchanging, or falling differential power, respectively. 
3. From a power stance, only capitalists with a positive DA are said to accumulate. 
These differential accumulators should be the center of analysis (ibid.: 313). 
 
Applying this definition to Korea, Figure 4 uses two different measures to examine 
the differential accumulation of the country’s three top business groups: Samsung Electronics, 
Hyundai Motor, and Posco.5 Differential capitalization (DK) is the ratio of the average mar-
ket capitalization of the top three corporations to the average market capitalization of all listed 
companies; differential earnings refers to the ratio of the average net profit of the top three 
corporations to the average net profit of all corporations (listed and unlisted).  
                                                 
4 Another relatively little-known exception is Farjoun and Machover’s Laws of Chaos, which attempts 
to combine the labor theory of value with stochastic analysis. 
5 As of the end of 2013, the market value of these three corporations accounted for 26.5 percent of the 
overall Korean stock market. 
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Let us begin with differential capitalization. This ratio was only 5 in the early 1980s 
(39.7 billion KRW compared to 7.7 billion KRW). By the early 2010s, it had risen to around 
60 (91 trillion KRW compared to 1.4 trillion KRW), a 12-fold increase. From the viewpoint of 
capital as power, this increase suggests that, relative to the average listed corporation, the dif-
ferential power of a typical top-three corporation in the early 2010s was 12-fold greater than 
in the early 1980s. The trend growth rate, which indicates the rate of differential accumulation 
(DA), shows that, during this period, the relative power of the top three firms had grown at an 
average annual rate of 8.3 percent.   
 
 
 
Figure 4 Analyses of Differential Accumulation 
 
* The top-three corporations consist of Samsung Electronics (listed in 1976), Hyundai Motor (listed in 
1974), and Posco (listed in 1988). Their market value does not include that of their preferred stocks.  
** “All corporations” does not include companies that reported net losses.  
 
Note: All series are expressed as three-year moving averages. 
 
Sources: KIS-VALUE; Bank of Korea; National Tax Service. 
 
 
Differential market capitalization reflects the way in which the market mechanism 
discounts into asset prices the potential impact of current and expected changes in institutional 
arrangements on profit flows. However, because the vast majority of firms in general and 
small firms in particular are unlisted, this measure may underestimate the overall power of 
dominant capital. In order to bypass this limitation, Nitzan and Bichler suggest another differ-
ential measure based on net profit. Given that capitalization is calculated as the risk-adjusted 
11 
 
discounted value of expected future earnings, i.e. capitalization ≡ future earnings / (risk ⅹ 
discount rate), we can expect, particularly over the long run, there to exist a positive correla-
tion between the differential capitalization of dominant capital (DK= KD /K) and its differen-
tial earnings (ED/E). Here, the D subscript denotes dominant capital; no subscript denotes the 
average capital.  
As we can see from Figure 4, the two measures, although very different in scale, are 
tightly correlated (with a Pearson coefficient of 0.88 over the 1981-2012 period). Differential 
earnings are calculated by dividing the average net profit of the top three corporations by the 
average net profit of all Korean corporations (total after-tax corporate profit divided by the 
number of corporate tax returns). In the early 1980s, this ratio was about 67 (7.6 billion KRW 
compared to 114 million KRW). By the early 2010s, it had risen to around 10,000 (7.3 trillion 
KRW compared to 681 million KRW), a 150 times increase! The trend growth rate of differ-
ential earnings suggests that, over the period, the differential accumulation-read-power of a 
top-three corporation grew at an average annual rate of 18.1 percent.  
 
 
4. Power Restructuring and the Changing Nature of Differential Accumulation 
 
Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of differential accumulation, which draws in part on Veblen’s 
concept of strategic sabotage, fits well with the evolution of Korean capitalism, from the 
emergence of the Korean chaebols during the era of state capitalism, through the financial 
crisis of 1997, to the so-called polarized growth that occurred in its wake. The key factor in 
this strategic sabotage is the Korean state; without the state’s exclusive institutional support, 
the chaebols would not be what they are today.  
During the authoritarian regime, protectionist policies enabled the chaebols to mo-
nopolize domestic markets, while repressive labor policies helped them maintain a production 
system characterized by low wages and long working hours. Furthermore, the state provided 
dominant capital with various types of financial support, including tax reductions, preferential 
interest and exchange rates, direct subsidies, and exclusive access to foreign loans. The advo-
cates of developmental statism (e.g. Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1991) claimed 
that these forms of state support were crucial for Korea’s rapid economic growth. This claim, 
though, is only partly true. It emphasizes overall growth, but this aggregate emphasis serves to 
conceal the underlying differential processes, whereby the fruits of communal efforts were 
increasingly privatized and concentrated in the hands of a few. From the viewpoint of capital 
as power, these policies are typical examples of strategic sabotage; while encouraging overall 
growth, they also strategically restricted and channelled this growth to fuel the differential 
accumulation—and therefore power—of Korea’s chaebols relative to other firms and the un-
derlying population.  
The polarized growth after the 1997 crisis can also be understood in this light. The 
decrease in fixed-capital investment, the increase in job insecurity through labor flexibiliza-
tion, and the intensification of the chaebols’ so-called “unfair trade practices” against small- 
and medium-sized companies, which critical economists refer to as indicators of polarized 
growth, are reminiscent of Veblen’s “business as usual”; they are all forms of strategic sabo-
tage geared to achieving differential accumulation for the chaebols.  
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The foregoing does not mean that nothing has changed in the wake of the 1997 crisis. 
Indeed, Korean society underwent radical neoliberal reform and consequently economic 
growth has become sluggish; job insecurity, especially among young people, has risen; and 
more importantly, social inequality has increased. To some, this record suggests that Korea’s 
neoliberal experiment is “a dismal failure for the majority of Korea’s people” (Crotty and Lee 
2006: 386). Yet it should be noted that, from the very outset, Korea’s ruling class implement-
ed neoliberal restructuring not to improve people’s wellbeing, but to consolidate their power.  
From the viewpoint of capital as power, the 1997 crisis and the radical restructuring 
in its wake represent a broader restructuring of power relations, a process whose quantitative 
manifestations are recorded by the ups and downs of differential accumulation. Since the mid-
1980s, the Korean ruling class had faced mounting internal and external pressure. The domes-
tic pressures came mostly from below. An ever-growing number of Koreans, having lost their 
patience with the military regime, joined street protests organized by university students. The 
situation was getting out of control, leaving military elites with the choice of either violently 
quelling the unrest, or giving in to demands for democratization. Simultaneously, Korea’s 
dominant capital was coming under increasing international pressure to abandon its Cold War 
protectionism. The country emerged as a key target for the expansion of global dominant capi-
tal, and the local elites were called on to structurally adjust Korea in line with the rising tide of 
neoliberalism. 
Initially, this domestic-global conjuncture appeared detrimental to Korean dominant 
capital, the chaebols. Domestically, there were more labor disputes in 1987 than in the entire 
1947-86 period. As a result, the real-wage increase between 1987 and 1991 averaged 12.5 
percent annually, whereas the average between 1982 and 1986 had been 5.4 percent (Statistics 
Korea). Externally, Korea was forced to open up. The country’s import-liberalization ratio, i.e. 
the ratio of unrestricted import items to total import items, rose rapidly from 69 percent in 
1980 to 94.7 percent in 1988 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry). These new circumstances 
meant that, in order to survive, the state-chaebol nexus had to be radically transformed.  
And indeed, rather than accepting neoliberalism passively, Korea’s ruling class chose 
to endorse the ensuing transformation in a way that served its own interests. This choice was 
symbolically reflected in the 1994 “globalization strategy” of the Kim Young Sam govern-
ment. Formally, this strategy echoed the pre-1997 accession requirements that Korea had to 
fulfil in order to become a full OECD member, which were in turn almost identical to those 
spelled out in the post-1997 IMF financial bailout package. But its actual implementation 
went far beyond the initial blueprint. 
The main catalyst was the 1997 crisis, which broke out in the middle of this restruc-
turing process. Most critical debates on the process focus on the IMF’s role in the crisis and 
the appropriateness of its remedial policies (e.g. Crotty and Lee 2009; Feldstein 1998; Wade 
1998). Feldstein (1998: 27-31), for instance, argued that it would have been enough for the 
IMF to “provide its technical advice” and help Korea to “persuade foreign creditors to contin-
ue to lend by rolling over existing loans as they came due.”   
Although important, this narrow preoccupation with policy serves to conceal the 
broader, structural origins of the crisis, both internal and external, and the ways in which these 
structural origins affected Korea’s dominant capital. Some of these structural roots were iden-
tified by Krugman (1994) and Jeong (1997). Krugman, following conventional growth ac-
counting, pointed to the limits of economic growth that were almost entirely dependent on the 
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mobilization of factor inputs without productivity increases, while Jeong, taking a social struc-
tures of accumulation approach, emphasized the impediments to further growth and accumula-
tion imposed by internal and external changes in power relations. Using the terminology of 
capital as power, we can say that Korean capitalism was approaching its “envelope.” Its old 
accumulation regime, built on the massive and oppressive mobilization of people in the 
broader context of the Cold War, had become unsustainable. For Korea’s leading capitalists to 
retain their primacy and continue their differential accumulation, all of Korean society had to 
be restructured. 
Jeong’s social structures of accumulation approach to the 1997 crisis and neoliberal 
reforms (2005, 1997) shares some similarities with the capital-as-power framework adopted in 
this article. But there is also a big difference. By analyzing the accumulation of capital in ag-
gregate terms, Jeong (1997: 109) concluded that “the imposition of neoliberalism would not 
guarantee high economic growth in the coming century” but “only aggravate the structural 
crisis of the Korean economy,” which in turn meant that neoliberal restructuring would not 
stop the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. In contrast, this paper takes a disaggregate view. 
According to the differential-accumulation approach, which focuses on redistribution, slug-
gish economic growth is not a failure of, but integral to, the new regime of accumulation. In 
the remainder of this section, I examine the 1997 crisis and the post-crisis restructuring from 
the viewpoint of the changing regime of differential accumulation. I analyze the limits of the 
old regime, and how these limits were transcended, giving rise to a new order characterized by 
intense strategic sabotage. 
As noted above, differential accumulation is measured primarily by the rate of 
change of differential capitalization, which can be proxied by the rate of change of differential 
earnings. Focusing on differential earnings, Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 327-33) identify four 
business strategies to increase corporate profit: green-field investment, mergers and acquisi-
tions, stagflation, and cost cutting, which they then associate with broad regimes of differen-
tial accumulation.  
More specifically, if we understand the level of corporate earnings as the product of 
the number of employees multiplied by the average earnings per employee (i.e. employees 
ⅹearnings per employee), a firm can achieve a positive rate of differential accumulation in 
the following two ways: either by expanding employment faster than the average to increase 
its market share, or by raising earnings per employee faster than the average. The first route is 
called “breadth”; the second is called “depth.” Focusing on a particular firm or group of firms 
(e.g. dominant capital), breadth can be measured by differential employment: the ratio of the 
number of employees of the group to the average of the business universe. Depth can be ex-
pressed as differential earnings per employee: the ratio of the profit per employee of the group 
to that of the average firm.  
Breadth can be further subdivided into two distinct forms: external breadth and in-
ternal breadth. External breadth denotes the increase of market share by a particular group of 
capital through the building of new capacity and by hiring new employees faster than the av-
erage. Without creating new capacity, the group can enjoy the same effect by taking over oth-
er existing companies. This way of increasing market share is referred to as internal breadth. 
Depth also has two distinct routes to differential accumulation. The group can increase its 
earnings per employee by cheapening production (i.e. cost-cutting) faster than the average, 
which is named internal depth. The group can achieve a similar outcome through stagflation if 
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it manages to increase its relative profit gains per unit faster than its relative decline in vol-
ume. This type of differential accumulation is called external depth. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Downward Pressure on Earnings per Employee 
 
Note: “Differential employment” expresses the ratio of the average number of employees of the domi-
nant-capital groups to the average number of employees per firm in the manufacturing sector. All series 
are expressed as three-year moving averages. 
 
Sources: Fair Trade Commission; Choi (2001); Bank of Korea. 
 
 
Applying this analytical framework to Korea during the years leading up to 1997, 
Figure 5 examines the evolution of differential employment and differential earnings per em-
ployee. The focus is on Korea’s 30 largest chaebols, which are the largest and most profitable 
corporate coalitions at the core of the Korean political economy, and which are treated here as 
the country’s dominant capital. Differential employment is measured by the ratio of the aver-
age number of employees of dominant capital to the average number of employees per firm in 
the manufacturing sector. Differential earnings per employee is measured by the ratio of the 
average net profit per employee of dominant capital to that of the average firm in the manufac-
turing sector.  
In the figure, this measure is disaggregated into two series, one for the top four and 
one for the top fifth to 30th conglomerates. The chart shows that the ongoing expansion of 
differential employment by Korea’s 30 largest chaebols was accompanied by stable or declin-
ing differential earnings per employee. This negative relationship is consistent with Nitzan 
and Bichler’s argument that “‘excessive’ green-field growth creates a downward pressure on 
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prices and hence on profit per employee” as strategic sabotage becomes too loose (2002: 49-
50).6  
According to the chart, Korea’s dominant capital sustained differential employment 
growth through the mid-1990s. The ratio grew by a factor of 2.5 during 1985-1996. While the 
green-field investment strategy of the four largest business groups in this period appears to 
have allowed them to maintain their level of differential earnings per employee, the other 26 
groups suffered from a relative profit squeeze. The ratio of earnings per employee for the fifth 
to 30th largest chaebols to the manufacturing sector’s average dropped below one in 1994, 
which means that they differentially decumulated in terms of depth. After that, their relative 
depth performance became even worse, with the ratio becoming negative in 1996. The 1997 
collapse of the Korean political economy started with these 26 chaebols, whose performance 
began to deteriorate well before the onset of the crisis.  
Seven of these chaebols filed for bankruptcy protection in 1997, even before the Ko-
rean government formally asked for an IMF bailout. The collapse of the Kia Group—the 
eighth largest chaebol in terms of the book value of total assets at that time—characterizes the 
limits of the pre-crisis breadth regime. Kia’s breakdown was triggered by the bankruptcy of its 
core firm, Kia Motors, whose main sin was “overinvestment.” Kia Motors—in competition 
with Hyundai Motor Company, Daewoo Motors, and Ssangyong Motor Company—was try-
ing to increase its domestic and export market share by rapidly expanding its productive ca-
pacity. This expansion relied heavily on debt financing, especially on short-term loans through 
non-bank financial institutions. As a result, the company’s debt-to-equity ratio rose from 2.7 
in 1987 to 8.1 in 1997, making Kia vulnerable to unfavorable shocks.7 To complicate matters, 
in 1995 Samsung Group entered the automobile sector, which was already struggling with 
“overcapacity.” The result was generalized downward pressure on automotive profit. Kia, 
which was the most vulnerable, was the first to fall, followed by Ssangyong Motor Company 
in 1998, Samsung Motors in 1999, and Daewoo Motors in 2000. These bankrupt companies 
were eventually amalgamated into Hyundai Motor Company, Shanghai Automotive Industries, 
Renault, and General Motors respectively, a breadth solution to a depth problem. 
Thus, in hindsight, we can say that the seeds of the crisis were planted well before 
1997. The decline of dominant capital’s differential earnings per employee coincided with the 
slowdown of GDP growth and the fall of the corporate income share, as shown in Figure 1. 
Graphically, this situation can be described as a downward slide to the right in Figure 3, an 
entry into a “danger zone,” where overcapacity loosens strategic sabotage and undermines the 
income share of capital. From the viewpoint of capital as power, the 1997 Korean crisis was 
the culmination of an overextended breadth regime. This regime had relied on the massive and 
oppressive mobilization of people domestically and on Cold War protectionism internationally. 
And by the early 1990s, both arrangements had started to crack. Using the same framework, 
                                                 
6 Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 331-3) associate the abovementioned breadth/depth taxonomy with broad 
regimes of differential accumulation. They claim that, historically, (1) breadth and depth tend to be mu-
tually exclusive and move counter-cyclically to each other; (2) differential accumulation progresses pri-
marily through internal breadth and external depth. It should be noted that regimes are different from the 
actions of individual firms. A single firm may combine various business strategies, including green-field 
investment, mergers and acquisitions, cost-cutting, and monopoly pricing. However, “the same does not 
hold true for dominant capital as a whole” because “the broader conditions that are conducive to one 
regime often undermining the other.”   
7 Author’s computations based on data from KIS-VALUE.  
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we can think of the “polarized growth” characteristic of the post-1997 period as the manifesta-
tion of rising strategic sabotage. In terms of Figure 3, capital in general and dominant capital 
in particular were moving up and to the left, intensifying their strategic sabotage to boost their 
differential accumulation and raise their income shares. And as we can see from Figure 6 be-
low, for dominant capital, the strategy proved highly successful. While overall growth stag-
nated, the Korean chaebols recorded massive increases in their differential earnings. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 The Differential Concentration of Corporate Profits 
 
* The ratio of the average net profit of the chaebols to the average net profit of all Korean corporations 
that are officially registered at the National Tax Service as limited-liability companies. 
** The crisis zone is the period during which either the chaebols’ profit or overall corporate profit was 
negative. Observations for this period are omitted.  
 
Sources: Fair Trade Commission; National Tax Service.  
 
 
The chart shows two indices of differential earnings: one for the top four chaebols, 
the other for the top 30 (note the log scale). The indices are computed by dividing the average 
net profit of dominant capital by the average net profit of all Korean corporations (total corpo-
rate profit after taxes divided by the number of tax returns). The data show that, in 1990-1992, 
the average profit of the top four chaebols was 1,191 times larger than that of the average Ko-
rean firm (206 billion KRW and 173 million KRW, respectively). In 2007-2009, this ratio had 
risen to 29,838 (7,141 billion KRW for the chaebols compared with 239 million KRW for the 
Korean average), a 25-fold hike in 20 years. The differential rise for the top 30 chaebols was 
almost as large; during the period, the index rose 22-fold, from 275 to 5,933.8 
                                                 
8 The average profit of the top 30 chaebols has risen from 47.5 billion KRW in 1990-1992 to 1,420 
billion KRW in 2007-2009. 
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Korea’s dominant capital used the crisis to consolidate its power and redistribute in-
come upward. In the post-1997 era, the influence of the chaebols on the government increased 
conspicuously, so much so that it has become common to refer to Korea as “the Republic of 
Samsung.” In the words of the country’s president: “as power has been transferred from the 
government to the market, the government cannot make policies against the interests of the 
business world.”9  
To resurrect the Korean chaebols, the corporate-government nexus adopted the fol-
lowing strategies: (1) socializing private debt into public debt; (2) undermining labor unions 
through mass layoffs and increased labor-market flexibility; (3) introducing radical deregula-
tion and liberalization; (4) providing lucrative incentives for foreign capital and the chaebols 
to attract investment; (5) privatizing the country’s most profitable state-owned enterprises.10 
Policymakers propagated these business-friendly policies as inevitable, arguing that 
they would quicken economic recovery and revitalize the growth engine of Korea. They also 
suggested that the benefits of economic growth would automatically “trickle down” to the 
underlying population. And indeed, the aggregate Korean economy has bounced back rapidly 
from the crisis, but the trickle-down effect has failed to materialize. The recovery has been 
differential, distributed in a way that has greatly amplified income and asset inequality. It 
seems that economic growth as such has not been the primary concern of the Korean ruling 
capitalist class. Seen from the viewpoint of capital as power, the post-1997 restructuring 
served to create a new regime of accumulation. The purpose of this regime, whether latent or 
conscientious, was to shift Korea from breadth to depth. The underlying goal was not to pro-
mote growth, but to eliminate the risk of glut associated with rapid green-field investment and 
lessen the resulting downward pressure on prices and profit.  
Figure 7 shows the differential consequences of this strategy. The chart plots the av-
erage earnings per employee of the top 30 chaebols relative to the manufacturing sector. We 
can see that the earnings per employee of both dominant capital and the manufacturing sector 
as a whole increased significantly after the 1997 crisis. But the respective increases were high-
ly differential. Comparing the period of 2001-2008 to the pre-crisis period of 1988-1995, earn-
ings per employee of the top 30 chaebols rose 15-fold (from 2.8 to 43.7 million KRW), 
whereas the manufacturing average rose only 10-fold (from 1.5 to 15.3 million KRW). All in 
all, the gap between the two groups increased by 54 percent, from 1.8 to 2.9.  
 
                                                 
9 Quotes from Rho Moo Hyun’s speech at a meeting to monitor progress in the cooperation between 
large and small- and medium-sized firms (July 5, 2005).  
10 For instance, Posco, the fifth-largest business group, which is also one of the world’s largest steel 
companies, was privatized in 2000. KT and KT&G, which respectively monopolized the wired commu-
nication and tobacco sectors until recently, were privatized in 2002. 
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Figure 7 Comparison of Earnings per Employee 
 
Sources: Fair Trade Commission; Bank of Korea. 
 
 
The chaebols’ increasing reliance on depth is paralleled by their decreased reliance 
on breadth. Whereas Figure 7 demonstrated the growing significance of differential profit per 
employee, Figure 8 shows the decreased emphasis on differential employment growth. The 
chart shows the differential employment of three dominant-capital groups: Samsung, the top 
four, and the top 30 chaebols, all benchmarked against the manufacturing average. Although 
data for the top 4 and top 30 chaebols begin only in the mid-1980s, those for Samsung indi-
cate how rapidly Korea’s dominant capital expanded its employment relative to the corporate 
average up until the 1997 crisis. In 1970, the ratio of employment per firm of Samsung to the 
manufacturing sector average was 254. By 1997, it was 9,120. In other words, on average, 
Samsung’s annual employment grew 14 percent faster than the manufacturing average. The 
difference in scale notwithstanding, the top four and the top 30 chaebols seem to have fol-
lowed the same pattern as Samsung. From 1985 to 1996, the ratio of employment per firm of 
the top four chaebols to the manufacturing average grew at an annual rate of 10 percent, while 
the same proxy for the top 30 chaebols grew by 9 percent. 
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Figure 8 Differential Employment: The Ratio of the Chaebols’ Average to the  
Manufacturing Average 
 
Sources: Fair Trade Commission; Bank of Korea.  
 
 
The 1997 crisis broke these uptrends. Within two years, 360,000 workers had been 
laid off by the top 30 chaebols, of whom one-third were accounted for by the top four. Since 
then, the differential employment of Korean dominant capital has recovered to its 1997 level, 
but its trajectory remains flat. In recent years, the chaebols have been heavily criticized for 
failing to create employment, but so far these critiques have fallen on deaf ears. With depth 
having substituted for breadth, the chaebols have little reason to risk their massive differential 
gains in earnings per employee by resurrecting the dangerous pre-crisis regime of differential-
employment growth.  
 
 
5. The Transition to Transnationalized Market Capitalism 
 
The “resurrection” of Korean dominant capital does not mean that the old mode of power was 
restored; the very nature of the corporate-government nexus has undergone fundamental 
changes. From the viewpoint of capital as power, the enormous post-1997 rise of the 
chaebols’ differential earnings represents the transformation of various institutional arrange-
ments and power relations among social groups. As mentioned earlier, the Korean corporate-
government nexus radicalized the post-crisis reform processes of liberalization, deregulation, 
privatization, and labor flexibilization. In this section, we examine how the Korean ruling 
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class leveraged this restructuring to turn the tables on the domestic population, and how this 
victory facilitated its integration into the transnational structure of global absentee ownership 
Ironically, the 1997 crisis was a blessing in disguise for Korea’s ruling class: it of-
fered it a golden opportunity to reconsolidate its power. Following the 1987 end of the mili-
tary dictatorship, the process of democratization and the emergence of organized labor and 
popular social movements had pushed the ruling class into a corner and robbed dominant capi-
tal of the labor obedience and low wages it had previously taken for granted.11 The 1997 cri-
sis tipped the balance of power from the underlying population back to the rulers. The process 
of “industrial rationalization” gave dominant capital the green light for mass layoffs.12 Regu-
lar employees have been increasingly displaced by temporary and contingent workers who 
receive lower wages, enjoy fewer benefits, and have little or no job security. All in all, work-
ers were made to suffer the brunt of the crisis, which, for dominant capital, meant lower costs.  
But the benefits for the ruling class extended beyond cost-cutting proper. The crisis 
enabled dominant capital to divide and rule the underlying population, particularly by sharp-
ening inner divisions and amplifying internal hierarchies within the working class. For in-
stance, according to Y. Kim (2011), while the average hourly wage of regular workers in-
creased by 77 percent, from 8,139 KRW in 2001 to 14,401 in 2010, the average hourly wage 
of contingent workers rose by only 53 percent, from 4,546 KRW to 6,951 KRW. The wage 
level of contingent workers decreased from 56 percent of that of regular workers in 2001 to 48 
percent in 2010. This increasing income gap widened a solidarity gap between the two groups, 
which, in turn, has weakened the power of organized labor relative to capital. 
The restructuring of domestic power relations coincided with and to some extent fa-
cilitated the transnationalization of Korea’s dominant capital through the spatial integration of 
ownership. This latter process was part and parcel of the newly emerged global accumulation 
regime, which was characterized by high foreign direct investment in emerging markets, capi-
tal-market liberalization, and worldwide cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Even though 
the development of Korean capitalism has been embedded in the global political economy 
from the very outset, until recently virtually all Korean companies were domestically owned. 
Since the early 1990s, though, and particularly following the 1997 crisis, the national identity 
of Korean corporations, especially of the core business groups, was gradually diluted. By the 
early 2000s, it was no longer possible to refer to dominant capital as a “Korean” business 
group.  
Figure 9 shows the share of foreign ownership in three groups of Korean firms: the 
top 10 chaebols, city banks, and the Korean stock-market capitalization as a whole. The over-
all trend in all indicators is up. Foreign ownership in the overall market has risen from negli-
gible levels in the early 1990s to roughly 30 percent in the 2000s, while for the top city banks 
the number rose to roughly 60 percent, up from 35 in 1999. The data for the top 10 chaebols 
indicate a more muted trend; but at roughly 30-40 percent, they surely represent massive in-
creases compared to the early 1990s.  
The increase of foreign investment was not confined to the stock market. For instance, 
the value of gross foreign assets, which comprise cash, deposits, loans, bonds, and equities 
                                                 
11 Succumbing to popular uprisings that year, dictator Jun Doo-Hwan promised to hand over political 
power peacefully and democratically.    
12 The Mass Layoff Law was enacted in 1997 and became effective in March, 1999. It provided new 
discretion to capitalists to dismiss workers for business reasons.  
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owned by non-residents, also increased rapidly: between 1994 and 2009, it more than tripled, 
rising from 25 to 82 percent of GDP (Bank of Korea). 
 
 
 
Figure 9 The Percentage Share of Foreign Investors in the Korean Business Universe in 
Terms of Market Capitalization 
 
Sources: Korea Exchange; Financial Supervisory Service; D. Kim (2007). 
 
 
The particularly high level of foreign ownership in the banking sector symbolizes the 
transition from state capitalism to market capitalism. During the early 1980s, virtually the en-
tire Korean banking sector was under state control. According to statist developmentalism (e.g. 
Amsden 1989; Woo-Cumings 1991), this “public” banking system played a central role in 
channelling resources into the industrial sector, thereby promoting rapid economic growth. 
Nowadays, though, the banking sector is in the hands of foreign investors: as of 2011, the for-
eign-ownership share of the seven major commercial banks is about 60 percent. 
With growing foreign ownership, particularly after the 1997 crisis, the accumulation 
basis of Korea’s dominant capital has become increasingly global. And with accumulation 
becoming more and more global, the autonomy of the Korean “nation state” has been under-
mined. Globalization means more than just the free flow of investments. Korea’s state organs 
and institutions have also been amalgamated into the global accumulation process. Through 
various free-trade and investment agreements, legislative and policy changes have been in-
creasingly shaped by the standards and demands of global dominant capital. Furthermore, 
Korean government policies have been subordinated to indicators of the country’s financial 
markets, which are themselves increasingly correlated with the ups and downs of the global 
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financial market. This subjugation, in turn, substantially weakens the effectiveness of domes-
tic macroeconomic policies. 
The central template of the neoliberal globalization of Korea is the establishment of 
the “market mechanism” in every corner of society, a process that is often characterized as the 
“retreat of the state.” This repeated mantra, propagated by policymakers and mainstream 
economists, has made the “free market” a sacrosanct ideal and state intervention something of 
a taboo in Korean society. Policymakers and mainstream economists promised that the self-
regulating mechanism of the free market would make the Korean economy more efficient and 
its society fairer and more equitable. That was the popular rationale for the neoliberal reforms. 
The actual outcome has been very different. The “free market” has meant freedom for the res-
urrected chaebols to exercise strategic sabotage. Suppliers and subcontractors have increasing-
ly complained that dominant capital forces them to endure unfair transaction practices, includ-
ing the supply of goods and services at “unjustly” low prices, intentional delays of payment, a 
concerted refusal to deal, and unfair transaction terms.13 This unlevel playing field has culmi-
nated in the massive upward redistribution of earnings, which, in turn, have resulted in the 
intensification of inequality in Korean society at large. For example, according to the Bank of 
Korea, the three-year moving average of Korea’s Gini coefficient rose from 0.26 in the early 
1990s to 0.31 by the late 2000s, a 21 percent increase. During the same period, the ratio of the 
income of the highest to the lowest quintiles (expressed as a three-year moving average) in-
creased from 3.8 to 5.7.  
 
 
6. The Transnational Fusion of Vested Interests 
 
Despite the rapid transnationalization of Korea’s dominant capital, the Korean politi-
cal economy continues to be understood within the framework of interstate relations. The in-
creasing foreign ownership of the core business group provoked a domestic backlash against 
foreign investment. Interestingly, the anti-foreign-investment campaigns have been initiated 
not by the Korean ruling capitalists who, ostensibly, might lose their control over the Korean 
political economy, but by the advocates of the old corporate-state coalition in the progressive 
camp (e.g. Chang and Jung 2005). As noted earlier, the latter held that foreign investors, pur-
suing nothing but short-term profits and high dividends, would drain the national wealth and 
severely weaken Korea’s growth engine. Yet it was Korea’s dominant capital that pushed 
hardest to liberalize the Korean political economy. For example, in 2006-2012, Hyundai Mo-
tors spent $ 2.7 million on lobbyists in the United States in an attempt to prompt Congress to 
approve the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement; the Federation of Korean Industries, led by 
chaebols, spent $1.4 million for the same purpose (Kookmin Daily, 3/March/ 2013). Figure 10 
may explain why Korea’s ruling capitalists do not oppose but actively pursue the liberalization 
of capital movements.  
 
                                                 
13 For example, the Fair Trade Commission recently accused Samsung Electronics of the illegal unilat-
eral cancellation of parts-purchase contracts (daily news briefing, May 23, 2012: http://www.ftc.go.kr). 
From January 2008 to November 2010, according to the Fair Trade Commission, Samsung Electronics 
terminated 28,000 purchasing contracts without any justification. In most of the cases, the goods that 
Samsung Electronics had ordered had already been prepared when it cancelled the contracts. 
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Figure 10 The Differential Capitalization of the Top 10 Chaebols 
 
* The ratio of the average market capitalization of the top 10 chaebols to the average market capitaliza-
tion of all listed corporations.  
** The market value of the stocks owned by the presidents of the top 10 chaebols.  
 
Sources: Korea Exchange; Bank of Korea. 
 
 
The chart shows two series covering the period after the 1997 crisis: the differential 
capitalization of the top 10 Korean chaebols and the market value of the stockholdings owned 
by the presidents of these chaebols. The average capitalization of the top 10 chaebols in 1998, 
a year after the 1997 crisis, was 19 times the capitalization of the average listed company (3.5 
trillion KRW vs. 184 billion KRW). By early 2011, this ratio had risen to around 48 (63.6 
trillion KRW vs. 1.3 trillion KRW), a 2.5-fold increase over a dozen years.14 And it is the 
chaebol families more than anyone else that have benefited from this differential capitaliza-
tion. The market value of the stocks possessed by the primary owners’ families as a whole 
increased from 937 billion KRW in 2000 to 28 trillion KRW in 2011, a more than 30-fold 
increase!  
In addition to their huge capital gains, the primary owners of the top 10 chaebols 
have also received very large dividends. According to the Korean Exchange, the aggregate 
dividend payments of all listed companies have increased from 3.8 trillion KRW in 2001 to 14 
trillion KRW in 2007. Due to the 2008 global financial crisis, dividend payments temporarily 
dropped to 8.7 trillion KRW. But they have bounced back pretty quickly: in 2010 and 2011 
respectively, companies listed on the Korean stock market managed to pay more than 13 tril-
                                                 
14 The aggregate concentration of Korean dominant capital, i.e. the percentage share of the top 10 
chaebols in the Korean stock market in terms of market capitalization, also rose from 25.7 percent to 
59.3 percent over the same period. 
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lion KRW in dividends to their shareholders. Dividend payments to foreign investors have a 
growth trend similar to that of total dividend payments, having increased from 1.2 trillion 
KRW in 2001 to 5.6 trillion KRW in 2007. Again, the chaebol families benefited from the 
rapid increase in dividend payments more than anyone else. According to Chaebul.Com, their 
dividend income rose from 24 billion KRW in 2001 to 158 billion KRW in 2007, and further 
to 172 billion KRW in 2011, a more than seven-fold increase. 
Advocates of the state-chaebol nexus have argued that the rapid increase in dividend 
payments during the 2000s was led by foreign investors who were interested in nothing but 
short-term profit. This claim is problematic on two counts. First, the increase in dividends has 
to be put in relative context. While absolute dividend payments have indeed risen during the 
neoliberal restructuring process, according to Bank of Korea data the ratio of dividend pay-
ments to net profits has in fact decreased. While in the 1980s, the average ratio of manufactur-
ing companies’ dividend payments to net profit was 32 percent, this rate dropped to 24 percent 
in the 1990s and to 19 percent in the 2000s. The average ratio of the dividend payments to the 
market value of all listed companies also decreased from 5.5 percent in the 1980s to 1.9 per-
cent in the 2000s.  
Second, it is hard to attribute the absolute increase in dividend payments during the 
2000s to “foreign financial capital” as opposed to “domestic industrial capital,” if only be-
cause the difference between these two categories has become decreasingly relevant. In my 
view, the rise in dividend payments was driven by the soaring differential earnings of domi-
nant capital, which has itself become increasingly transnational. On the one hand, as the barri-
ers to foreign ownership of domestic stocks were gradually lifted beginning in the early 1990s, 
foreign investment in the Korean stock market rose and, consequently, the share of dividends 
in foreign-investment income has increased relative to the share of interest per annum. On the 
other hand, the rapid expansion in the differential earnings of dominant capital led to the in-
crease of dividend income in absolute terms. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has attempted to offer an alternative understanding of Korea’s neoliberal globaliza-
tion resulting from the 1997 financial crisis and the radical social restructuring in its wake. 
The paper challenges the two predominant approaches to Korea’s recent social transformation: 
the frameworks of state versus market on the one hand and domestic industrial capital versus 
foreign financial capital on the other. Arguing that these dichotomies preclude us from grasp-
ing the nature of Korea’s recent social transformation, I have tried to go beyond their limits by 
adopting Nitzan and Bichler’s perspective of capital as power.  
The capital-as-power approach is characterized by the following two key premises, 
which distinguish it from both Marxist and neoclassical approaches. First, the value of a 
commodity, the profit of a firm, and the accumulation of capital are not based so much on 
productive activities such as utils or labor time but on capitalists’ strategic sabotage in the 
Veblenian sense, a deliberate limitation on the productive capacity of society and the exclu-
sion of other capitalists from business opportunities. Second, this capitalists’ politics of exclu-
sion is quantified in their relative claims on nominal income streams and discounted assets. 
Nitzan and Bichler’s approach has allowed us to build a bridge, tentative but nonetheless 
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meaningful, between the huge increases in the differential accumulation of the Korean 
chaebols and the consolidation of the power of Korea’s ruling class in the wake of the 1997 
crisis. It is this expansion of differential accumulation (read power) through the intensification 
of strategic sabotage that has resulted in the reduction of green-field investment and the esca-
lation of social inequality, relative to the pre-1997 period. Nitzan and Bichler’s approach has 
also enabled us to explore the incorporation of Korean dominant capital into the transnational 
structure of global absentee ownership. 
The 1997 crisis tested Korean dominant capital, but it also offered it a good oppor-
tunity. Neoliberal restructuring, which accelerated after the crisis, has culminated in massive 
differential profits and capitalization for dominant capital. Furthermore, it was the Korean 
chaebol families, more than any other social group, that benefited from the restructuring pro-
cess. Contrary to the argument made by advocates of developmental statism, the transnational-
ization of ownership has actually strengthened, not weakened, these families’ power. Their 
success in expanding their power over society should be attributed not to good luck, but to 
their active engagement in the restructuring of society. In other words, the massive differential 
profits and accumulation of the transnationalized chaebols in the post-1997 period should be 
understood as a consequence of power restructuring. On the one hand, by increasing complex 
cross-holdings, these families have leveraged the enormous inflows of foreign investment 
without losing their managerial grip on dominant capital. On the other hand, by taking ad-
vantage of and later aggravating the increased job insecurity after the 1997 crisis, they have 
regained the upper hand over labor, which has, in turn, led to the intensification of inequality 
in Korean society at large. 
“Battle lines” should be drawn not between “domestic industrial capital” and “for-
eign financial capital,” but between transnationalized dominant capital and the underlying 
population. In the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the Korean ruling class accelerated neoliberal 
deregulation, liberalization, and labor flexibilization. Through these institutional rearrange-
ments, Korea’s ruling class, transcending its parochial boundaries, has turned itself into a 
group of global absentee owners; Korean society has become increasingly integrated into the 
global mega-machine of differential accumulation. Consequently, the interests of “domestic 
capital” are inseparably fused with those of “foreign capital.” They have become amalgamated 
in a single bloc of transnationalized dominant capital that pursues the accumulation of power 
over society.  
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